>Fact of the matter Leo is that Clinton did take shots at
>Osama,and came d****closer to hitting then Bush has.
>Bush knew of the threat from Osama long before 911.He had
>all the intel on this guy,and the menace he was to
>America.And he did nothing.Not one thing.Clinton knew there
>was a threat,took a shot,and retired.This one is not on
>Clinton.
Well Tallcal, lets see what also happened...
first there is this from the LA Times on December 5, 2001, "Clinton Let Bin Laden Slip Away and Metastasize" by By Mansoor Ijaz
President Clinton and his national security team ignored several opportunities to capture Osama bin Laden and his terrorist associates, including one as late as last year.
I know because I negotiated more than one of the opportunities.
From 1996 to 1998, I opened unofficial channels between Sudan and the Clinton administration. I met with officials in both countries, including Clinton, U.S. National Security Advisor Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger and Sudan's president and intelligence chief. President Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir, who wanted terrorism sanctions against Sudan lifted, offered the arrest and extradition of Bin Laden and detailed intelligence data about the global networks constructed by Egypt's Islamic Jihad, Iran's Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas.
Among those in the networks were the two hijackers who piloted commercial airliners into the World Trade Center.
The silence of the Clinton administration in responding to these offers was deafening.
As an American Muslim and a political supporter of Clinton, I feel now, as I argued with Clinton and Berger then, that their counter-terrorism policies fueled the rise of Bin Laden from an ordinary man to a Hydra-like monster.
Realizing the growing problem with Bin Laden, Bashir sent key intelligence officials to the U.S. in February 1996.
The Sudanese offered to arrest Bin Laden and extradite him to Saudi Arabia or, barring that, to "baby-sit" him--monitoring all his activities and associates.
But Saudi officials didn't want their home-grown terrorist back where he might plot to overthrow them.
In May 1996, the Sudanese capitulated to U.S. pressure and asked Bin Laden to leave, despite their feeling that he could be monitored better in Sudan than elsewhere.
Bin Laden left for Afghanistan, taking with him Ayman Zawahiri, considered by the U.S. to be the chief planner of the Sept. 11 attacks; Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, who traveled frequently to Germany to obtain electronic equipment for Al Qaeda; Wadih El-Hage, Bin Laden's personal secretary and roving emissary, now serving a life sentence in the U.S. for his role in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya; and Fazul Abdullah Mohammed and Saif Adel, also accused of carrying out the embassy attacks.
Some of these men are now among the FBI's 22 most-wanted terrorists.
But let's see what the 9/11 report says;
In late 1995, when Bin Ladin was still in Sudan, the State Department and the CIA learned that Sudanese officials were discussing with the Saudi government the possibility of expelling Bin Ladin. U.S.Ambassador Timothy Carney encouraged the Sudanese to pursue this course.The Saudis,however,did not want Bin Ladin, giving as their reason their revocation of his citizenship.6
Sudan’s minister of defense, Fatih Erwa, has claimed that Sudan offered to hand Bin Ladin over to the United States.The Commission has found no credible evidence that this was so.Ambassador Carney had instructions only to push the Sudanese to expel Bin Ladin.Ambassador Carney had no legal basis to ask for more from the Sudanese since, at the time, there was no indictment out-standing.7
Here are the notes for those statements;
6. On Sudanese discussions with Saudi officials, see Frank interview (Mar. 18, 2004); Ron interview (Mar. 18, 2004).Timothy Carney believed the Saudis told Sudan that they did not want Bin Ladin.Timothy Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003).
7.The CIA official who held one-on-one discussions with Erwa said that Erwa never offered to expel Bin Ladin to the United States or render him to another country.Mark interview (May 12,2004).For Carney’s instructions and the lack of a U.S.indictment,see Timothy Carney interview (Dec.4,2003).On the indictment issue and the supposed Sudanese offer to give up Bin Ladin, see Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
In early May 1996, the CIA received intelligence that Bin Ladin might be leaving Sudan.Though this reporting was described as “very spotty,†it would have been passed along to the DCI’s office because of high concern about Bin Ladin at the time. But it did not lead to plans for a U.S. operation to snatch Bin Ladin, because there was no indictment against him. Ron interview (Mar. 18, 2004); Frank interview (Mar. 18, 2004). It appears, how-ever, that if another country had been willing to imprison Bin Ladin, the CIA might have tried to work out a scenario for apprehending him. CIA cable, May 8, 1996.The Sudanese government did not notify the United States that Bin Ladin had left the country until about two days after his departure. DOS cable, Nairobi 07020,“Sudan: Foreign Minister on Developments,†May 21, 1996.
President Clinton, in a February 2002 speech to the Long Island Association, said that the United States did not accept a Sudanese offer and take Bin Ladin because there was no indictment. President Clinton speech to the Long Island Association, Feb. 15, 2002 (videotape of speech). But the President told us that he had “misspoken†and was,wrongly,recounting a number of press stories he had read.After reviewing this matter in preparation for his Commission meeting, President Clinton told us that Sudan never offered to turn Bin Ladin over to the United States.President Clinton meeting (Apr.8,2004).Berger told us that he saw no chance that Sudan would have handed Bin Ladin over and also noted that in 1996, the U.S. government still did not know of any al Qaeda attacks on U.S. citizens. Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004).
Alleged Sudanese offers to cooperate on counterterrorism have been the subject of much recent controversy. After repeatedly demanding that Sudan stop supporting terrorist groups, in 1993 the U.S. government designated the country a state sponsor of terrorism. Diplomatic discussions continued but had little impact on Sudanese sup-port for terrorism or on other issues,such as human rights.In the fall of 1995,the United States conducted a Sudan policy review and, supported by a vocal segment of Congress, the White House sought to pressure and isolate the Sudanese. Susan Rice interview (Jan. 9, 2004).
After Bin Ladin left Sudan in May 1996, some State Department officials, including Ambassador Carney, criticized the NSC’s hard-line policy, which he felt provided no “carrots†for Sudanese moderates to cooperate on counterterrorism. He also faulted the NSC for not reopening the U.S. embassy in Khartoum (closed in early 1996) when security concerns there were reevaluated. State’s Sudan desk officer agreed, noting that the embassy was an excellent vehicle for gathering information on terrorists.According to one State official,NSC policymakers’views were too firmly set to engage and test the Sudanese on counterterrorism.Timothy Carney interview (Dec.4,2003); David Shinn interview (Aug. 29, 2003); Stephen Schwartz interview (Dec. 30, 2003).
But supporters of the tough line, such as the NSC’s Susan Rice, argued that any conciliatory statements from Khartoum belied its unhelpful actions. For example, she noted, though Sudan did eventually expel Bin Ladin, his al Qaeda network retained a presence in the country. Susan Rice interview (Jan. 9, 2004). In addition, the CIA’s Africa Division, whose operatives had engaged the Sudanese on counterterrorism in early 1996, would conclude that “there is no indication that Sudanese involvement with terrorism has decreased in the past year.â€They saw the Sudanese gestures toward cooperating as “tactical retreatsâ€aimed at deceiving Washington in hopes of having sanctions removed. CIA memo,Walter to Acting DCI,“Africa Division’s Recommendations Regarding Sudan,†Dec. 17, 1996.The CIA official who ran the Sudanese portfolio and met with the Sudanese on numerous occasions told us the Sudanese were not going to deliver, and the perceived moderates “were just flat-out lying.†Mark interview (May 12, 2004).
In February 1997, the Sudanese sent letters to President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright, extending an invitation for a U.S.counterterrorism inspection mission to visit Sudan.The Sudanese also used private U.S.citizens to pass along offers to cooperate. Mansoor Ijaz interview (May 7, 2004); Janet McElligot interview (Oct. 20, 2003). But these offers were dismissed because the NSC viewed Sudan as all talk and little action. U.S. officials also feared that the Sudanese would exploit any positive American responses, including trips to the region by U.S. officials, for their own political purposes.See Joint Inquiry interview of David Williams,June 26,2002.Today,Sudan is still listed as a state sponsor of terrorism.
OK you be the judge with this one but I am going to point something out, there is one thing in the 9/11 report that I know that is wrong. I know this for a number of reasons and brought this to the attention of the person who was interviewed who informed the commission before i contacted them that the information was not transcribe correcly from the interveiw. A commissioner said that all the "information is open for interpetation and not to be taken as completely correct in any context" - taken right from the forwarded email.
You tell me what that means, I take it that they select some information to remove and select other information to change as they see fit. Iread the entire report and to me this cheapens the report, the commission (which was already cheapen by Gorelick being on the commission) and wastes a lot of money.
